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Notes
Characterizing Horizontal Market-Division
Agreements Under the Ancillary
Restraints Doctrine
INTRODUCTION

Since the 1960's, marketing arrangements in many businesses
have become more complex as firms seek to distribute their products in conjunction with national advertising and promotional
campaigns.' Typically, manufacturers or retailers will allocate territories in order to facilitate the efficient distribution of their products. 2 If not properly implemented, such an arrangement, referred
to as a market-division agreement, may be an illegal restraint of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.3
1. The increased sophistication of marketing techniques has caused tension vis-a-vis
the antitrust laws. As Philip Kotler has noted, "some students of business regulation go
so far as to charge that judges and the Federal Trade Commission have remade the law
into a body of rules of which a large portion impair competition. But, by and large,
regulations are needed to keep businessmen fearful about overstepping the line in trying
to neutralize competition through marketing arrangements." See P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 39 (1976).
2. For example, a group of small manufacturers might want to adopt a common
trademark in order to obtain the kind of public visibility that a large manufacturer is able
to achieve on its own. Each manufacturer, however, may hesitate to commit its own
resources to advertising the trademark in the hope that others will do so, thus enabling it
to be able to take advantage of the others' advertising. If enough of the manufacturers
resort to this practice, the purpose of the common trademark will be defeated. This
problem can be overcome by allocating territories to each manufacturer and forbidding it
to sell under the trademark outside of its territory. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
225-26 (1974).
3. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1(1982) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal ...
See generally LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT ch. 3 (1965) for a worthwhile discussion of the legal and
political background of the Sherman Act; Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 6 J. LAW & ECON. 7 (1966). Professor Bork has argued from a close
reading of the legislative history that the Act was intended to forbid anticompetitive behavior strictly in the economic sense. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept. Price Fixing and Market-Division (Part1), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market-Division (PartII), 75
YALE L.J. 375 (1966).
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Under antitrust law, courts determine the legality of challenged
market-division agreements by initially characterizing the restraint
as one that is either per se illegal' or alternatively, as a restraint
that will be judged under the rule of reason.5 Since a per se proscription finds illegality on the face of the agreement without further examination, the initial label which courts attach to a marketdivision agreement is crucial.6 Currently, the legality of challenged
market-division agreements dividing markets between a manufacturer and its retailers is determined under a rule of reason analysis. 7

Agreements

dividing

markets among competing firms,

4. A plaintiff may also establish a per se case for other illegal conduct, see, e.g., Klor's
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (group boycotts and refusals to deal:
electrical appliance retailer and manufacturers' of appliances agreement to boycott retailer's competitor held to be per se illegal); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (tying agreements: railroad which sold land only upon the condition that
purchasing companies ship over the seller's raillines held illegal per se); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 158 (1940) (price-fixing: spot purchases by oil
company which tended to stabilize the price of "distress gasoline" found to be illegal per
se); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 320 U.S. 373, 379 (1911) (resale
price maintenance: price restriction required of retailers by the manufacturer of patent
medicines held per se illegal); see also infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
5. Market-division agreements which are not believed to have an inherently pernicious effect on competition are judged for their reasonableness by assessing their purpose
and effect on the market. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
59 (1977) (market-division agreement implemented by a television set manufacturer
among hand-picked retailers held to be a restraint to be assessed under the rule of reason). The rule of reason has also been applied to market perfecting arrangements, see
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925) (shared data disseminated between members of a trade association made available to buyers and sellers
found reasonable under the rule of reason). But see American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921) (members of trade association who shared
specific prices charged to identified customers in closed transactions found to be in violation of the Sherman Act); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (blanket licensing to buyers of copyrighted musical compositions held
to be a restraint to be judged under the rule of reason).
6. It is crucial that a market-division agreement be characterized as a restraint of
trade to be analyzed under the rule of reason if the agreement is to survive at all.
Although the per se rule contains a degree of arbitrariness, it reflects the view that the
gains from the rule outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages will
result. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am. 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (exchange of price information between building material sellers held illegal per se).
7. This type of agreement is referred to as a vertical agreement. A vertical agreement
links two markets in the same chain of manufacture or distribution, usually through the
linkage of two firms that can stand in the relationship of supplier and customer. See
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 388 (1967) (bicycle manufacturer
restrictions on resale for its resellers and distributors held to be illegal per se). A marketdivision agreement implemented by a manufacturer upon its resellers is an example of a
vertical agreement. The Supreme Court has held that vertical market-division agreements are to be tested under the rule of reason. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977).
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however, are relegated to the illegal per se category.I
Economic analysis recognizes that competing firms may divide
markets for procompetitive as well as anticompetitive purposes. 9
The most common procompetitive purpose underlying the implementation of a market-division agreement is the elimination of
"free-riding"' among retailers who might otherwise take advantage of advertising and promotional efforts paid for by other retailers."1 The per se rule which is currently applied to agreements
among competing firms that are motivated by such procompetitive
reasons, however, restricts potential economic benefit from increased competition among the agreeing firms.' 2
An alternative apparatus exists which courts can utilize to assess
the legality of market-division agreements implemented by competing firms. The ancillary restraints doctrine 3 presents a standard test by which potentially procompetitive agreements are
elevated from the illegal per se category to a rule of reason analy8. A market-division agreement implemented by competing firms or firms in the same
line of business is horizontal. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S.
158, 163 (1964) (joint venture between two chemical companies engaged in the same line
of business termed horizontal). A horizontal market-division involves only one market
level. For example, four firms that manufacture identical widgets and consequently agree
to divide the market in which they sell their widgets would be participating in a horizontal market-division agreement. Similarly, if the four firms agreed to fix the price for their
widgets, they would be participating in a horizontal price-fixing agreement. Both agreements have identical consequences: prices move upward because output has been restricted. See E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 188-89 (1981).
The Supreme Court in United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972),
relegated horizontal market-division agreements to the illegal per se category.
9. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
10. Professor Robert Bork has categorized the five most obvious ways in which market-division is capable of enhancing the efficiency of business transactions. By far, the
most common market-division is aimed at the elimination of the free-rider problem. This
note necessarily will confine itself to that problem.
The other four procompetitive market-division agreements that Bork has categorized
intend to: (1) optimize local sales efforts by eliminating the size of the market; (2) encourage exchanges of information; (3) minimize the cost of providing post-sale service
and minimize the risk of customer dissatisfaction; (4) prevent overlapping use of a service
whose cost is shared. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 430-31 (1979).
11. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: CASES, NOTES & ECONOMIC MATERIAL 22526 (1974).
12. The finality of the per se rule precludes defendants from presenting justification
arguments which might otherwise demonstrate the procompetitive effects of their agreement. By the same token, the finality and predictability of the per se rule has eliminated
hundreds of anticompetitive agreements and no doubt others have been made less effective. See generally R. BORK, supra note 10, at 263.
13. The ancillary restraints doctrine was formulated in United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See
generally Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 ANTITRUST L.J. 211
(1959).
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sis." The doctrine distinguishes between "naked" 15 and "ancillary" 16 restraints and applies per se illegality to a naked marketdivision agreement whose sole purpose is the elimination of competition. An agreement which is ancillary to a lawful purpose, on the
other hand, is analyzed under the rule of reason regardless of
whether it has been implemented by competing firms. 7
In General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Association,'8 the Seventh Circuit employed this doctrine to assess the legality of a market-division agreement implemented by a group of
truck lessors. Application of the ancillary restraints doctrine enabled the court to characterize the agreement as a naked restraint
based upon the lack of increased efficiency and competition resulting from the agreement.1 9 After determining that the market-division was a naked restraint of trade, the Seventh Circuit relegated
the agreement to the per se category.20
This note will briefly describe the economic structure of marketdivision agreements and their relationship to the elimination of
free-riding. It will then examine the development of the characterization rules currently utilized by courts to categorize market-division agreements. The ancillary restraints doctrine will then be
14. See infra note 95.
15. A "naked" restraint of trade is an agreement in which the parties have no significant dealing other than the elimination of competition. For example, if two widget
manufacturers enter into an agreement to lower the output of their respectively similar
products in order to raise prices, the resulting trade restraint is intended to eliminate
competition. It has no lawful business purpose. See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281-82. For
a more detailed discussion of the mechanics of a naked restraint of trade see infra notes
97-98 and accompanying text.
16. An "ancillary" restraint of trade is an agreement which is subordinate and collateral to a separate, lawful business purpose. For example, if four widget manufacturers
enter into an agreement to divide territories in which they send sales representatives because their particular market is too small to repay the efforts of two sellers of a single
brand, the restraint is an ancillary one because it is subordinate to the lawful purpose of
increasing widget sales in markets which might otherwise go untapped altogether. See
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of an
ancillary restraint see infra note 97.
17. The ancillary restraints doctrine, for example, would elevate an ancillary marketdivision agreement among competing firms to the rule of reason category, see, e.g., General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1984).
TwT,
wa
rider c,.ur-. taw, however, the agreement is illegal per se. See, e.g., United States v.
Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). As a characterization device, the ancillary
restraints doctrine preserves the per se and the rule of reason categories. The doctrine's
fundamental criterion for characterizing market-division agreements is not their vertical
or horizontal nature, but their capacity for contributing to efficiency. See R. BORK, supra
note 10, at 30.
18. 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
19. Id. at 595.
20. Id.
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introduced and discussed. Finally, the General Leaseways opinion
will be analyzed and the efficacy of the ancillary restraints doctrine
as applied thereto will be discussed.
BACKGROUND

The Nature of Market-Division Agreements
The most direct manner in which competing firms can reap monopoly profits 2 ' is by agreeing to fix the price of a similar or identical product which the firms sell. 22 Firms may reap monopoly
profits not only by implementing direct price-fixing agreements,
however, but also indirectly by agreeing to eliminate competition
by dividing markets.23 A market-division agreement which is implemented by a manufacturer among its resellers is termed a vertical market-division.24 Alternatively, an agreement implemented
among the retailers themselves is termed a horizontal market21. "Monopoly profit" is the excess of total revenue over total costs which a firm that
holds a monopoly will receive by being a sole producer or, alternatively, a producer that
colludes with others to fix prices or allocate an exclusive territory. In a perfectly competitive industry, for example, all the producing firms will set output at a level where their
marginal revenue equals marginal cost, with "cost" in the economic sense including a
reasonable return on invested capital. The monopolist, be it a multi-national giant with
no competitors, or a small firm with an exclusive market, can raise its price and lower its
output in order to reap excess marginal revenue. The excess is monopoly profit. See R.
BORK, supra note 10, at 90-104; R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 5-14.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (direct price
fixing plan among competitors in the plumbing industry held to be per se unlawful);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898) (agreement among competitors to set schedule rates for railroad service held to be per se illegal direct price-fixing).
The courts have held a variety of direct price-fixing arrangements to be per se unlawful.
Among such per se unlawful arrangements are conspiracies to submit collusive, noncompetitive rigged bids. See, e.g., United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d
312, 317 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Koppers Corp., 652 F.2d 290, 297 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co.,
598 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Flom, 558 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 938 (1978); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732,
748-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817-18 (1954).
In certain circumstances, agreements among competitors to engage in cooperative
price advertising have been held to be illegal direct price-fixing agreements. See, e.g.,
United States v. Serta Assoc., 296 F. Supp. 1121, 1125-26 (N.D. Il1. 1968), aff'd mem.,
393 U.S. 534 (1969) (cooperative advertising program used by horizontal competitors
conditioning dealer participation on all advertising containing suggested retail prices held
to be direct price-fixing); United States v. Pittsburgh Area Pontiac Dealers, Inc., 1978-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,233 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (consent decree terminating litigation charging dealers with advertising as a group and listing prices for dealer models).
23. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951) (agreement
among American, French, and British corporations to allocate international trade territories held illegal as part of an aggregate of trade restraints).
24. See supra note 7.
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division.5

Firms may divide markets geographically,26 technically by type
of product,27 or functionally by classes of customers.2" By eliminating competitors, the single remaining firm becomes a monopolist in
the market it has been allocated.2 9 The firm can raise prices, or it
may withdraw supplies from the market, thus indirectly raising the
price of its product.3 ° Consequently, consumers pay higher prices
than those that would be set by competition. 3 1
25. See supra note 8.
26. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 240-41 (combination among pipe manufacturers to allocate business found illegal); Topco, 405 U.S. at 608 (agreement among supermarket chains to allocate territories for private label merchandise held per se unlawful).
27. See, e.g., Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distrib., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376,
1382-83 (9th Cir. 1981), (agreement among auto import dealers to allocate big ticket
sports cars); cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1982); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d
1068, 1072 (2d Cir. 1980) (agreement to allocate dictation machines according to technical sophistication); Arizona v. American Petrofina, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,398 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (agreement to classify petroleum refiners by level of gasoline
refined).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1981) (customer allocation per se unlawful); cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1982); United States v.
Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1087-90 (5th Cir.) (customer allocation conspiracy wherein competitors agreed not to solicit others' accounts and balanced among
themselves those accounts that changed held per se illegal), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903
(1978); United States v. Penn. Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.) (agreement
between refuse pick-up customers to allocate roll-off and industrial customers held per se
illegal), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966); United States v. Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563,
575-76 (2d Cir. 1961) (agreement among laundry companies dividing factory processes
for clothing items held per se unlawful).
29. A "monopolist" in the traditional sense is the only producer of its product and
faces no outside competition. After a market-division agreement is implemented, the
same state of affairs results: the market-division monopolist is the only producer or seller
in its territory and it faces no competition. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 8, at 181-82.
30. In an industry with a large number of sellers, each relatively small, an individual
firm will not assume that market prices can be affected by its own output decision. Each
firm will take costs and prices as given and will set output at a level maximizing returns at
given prices. This model, generally known as the competitive model, encourages independent, competitive conduct. Under the competitive model, forces and materials are
efficiently allocated among the various lines of industry.
A monopolist, on the other hand, because its output is the output of the industry,
recognizes that as it increases output, the prices it can charge will decrease. The monopolist therefore adjusts output and price to maximize return. Consequently, output for the
industry will be lower and profits higher than if the industry functioned competitively.
-- s.,on ;a1tgh
Market-division generally o.c.urs in an .in.h. t whiere the
not an exceedingly large number of firms. The industry may function competitively, but
if the firms agree upon a cooperative market-division policy they can lower industry output much as a monopolies would. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST § 61
(1981).
31. Decreased output harms consumers by artificially driving the price of the product
upward. Senator John Sherman, the prime mover of the legislation which bears his
name, made clear the objective to be served by the antitrust laws. The bill declares illegal
two classes of "arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations: (1) those
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Economic analysis recognizes, however, that market-division
agreements can also enhance competition when they are employed
to make productive activity more efficient.32 The most commonly
implemented procompetitive market-division agreement is aimed
at the elimination of the free-rider problem.33 For example, the
competitive efficiency of a firm that retails Steinway pianos may be
impaired by the presence of a free-riding Steinway dealer located
nearby. If Steinway dealer A provides an elaborate showroom,
demonstrations, and other services that consumers demand, it
must cover the costs incurred by raising the price of its pianos.
Steinway dealer B, a free-rider, rather than provide any services,
can suggest to its customers that they first utilize dealer A's services to select the piano they want and return to dealer B for the
purchase. Dealer B can offer lower prices than dealer A because it
does not incur the expenses that dealer A incurs in providing services.34 Faced with dealer B's lower priced competition, dealer A
may eventually stop providing services and Steinway piano sales
may decrease.35
A geographical market-division agreement allocating exclusive
territories to Steinway piano retailers will solve the free-rider problem by eliminating intrabrand competition.36 With intrabrand
competition removed, interbrand competition37 with, for instance
made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition, and (2) those
designed, or which tend to advance cost to the consumer ... " For a detailed and interesting discussion of the policies behind the Sherman Act see Bork, Legislative Intent and
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW AND EcON. 7 (1966).
32. See supra note 10.
33. The common occurrence of the free-rider elimination agreement has found its
way to the Supreme Court as well. The two main cases which address procompetitive
market-division are Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) and
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Both of these cases are freerider elimination cases.
34. The Steinway retailers example concerns firms in the same line of business. Alternatively, competing firms can implement a market-division agreement to eliminate
free-riding if they all offer one product in common but compete with each other nonetheless. For example, if several small grocery chains form an association to distribute private-label products in order to compete with A & P and Safeway's lower priced brands,
they might be inclined to implement a market-division agreement to eliminate free-riding
if advertising costs are not shared. In this case, there is decreased intrabrand competition
vis-A-vis the private label products. Interbrand competition with other grocery chains
may be enhanced.
35. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at § 72 (1977).
36. "Intrabrand competition" is the competition between the distributors, wholesale
or retail, of the product of a particular manufacturer. Continental TN., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52, n.19 (1977).
37. "Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers or resellers
of the same generic product," pianos in this example. "The degree of intrabrand compe-
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Baldwin piano retailers, may be enhanced because Steinway retailers are assured that their prices will not be undercut by other Steinway dealers. 38 The assurance of an exclusive territory encourages
Steinway dealers to increase advertising and sales efforts, carry
larger inventories, and provide higher quality maintenance and repair service which attracts prospective piano buyers.39
In the Steinway piano example, a market-division agreement
may be implemented by the piano manufacturer among its retailers
or, alternatively, by an agreement implemented among the Steinway retailers themselves.'
Either market-division agreement,
whether implemented by vertical or horizontal structure, would be
aimed at eliminating the free-rider problem and can be procompetitive. 4 ' Many courts rely exclusively upon the structure by which
the agreement is implemented to determine the legality of the
agreement.4 2 Consequently, horizontal market-division agreements
have been generally found to be illegal per se43 while vertical agreements have been judged under a rule of reason standard."
tition is wholly independent of the level of interbrand competition confronting the manufacturer or reseller." Id.
38. Id. at 54-56.
39. Professor Posner has noted that the availability of these services may increase a
consumer's desire to deal with firms that offer them, especially if the firms sell high-priced
products like pianos or automobiles. See R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 148-50.
40. See supra notes 7-8.
41. The fundamental difference between the structure of horizontal and vertical market-division lies with the parties who are imposing the restraint. A horizontal marketdivision is imposed by firms at the same market-level. Economic analysis suggests that it
is as likely that horizontal market-division is imposed to restrict output as it is to increase
business efficiency. A vertical market-division, on the other hand, is imposed by a manufacturer on its resellers. Economic analysis suggests that vertical market-division is generally implemented to increase business efficiency because the manufacturer desires to
encourage rather than restrict competition for its own benefit. Horizontal market division agreements, however, can also be implemented to increase competition. See R. PosNER, supra note 11, at 149-50.
42. See, e.g., New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881, 885
(10th Cir. 1957) (any horizontal agreement among local competitors, or with manufacturers, which has the purpose or effect of apportioning territories is illegal per se); Pfotzer
v. Aqua Sys. Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) (it is immaterial to the illegality of horizontal territorial limitation that the agreement does not set up impenetrable boundaries);
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (the fact
that defendants do not dominate industry involved is immaterial to illegality of agrccment establishing horizontal territorial limitations).
43. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
44. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977).
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CharacterizingMarket-Division Agreements: The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Rule
Courts determine the legality of challenged trade restraints 45 by
initially characterizing the restraint as one that is either per se illegal 46 or, alternatively, as a restraint that will be judged under the
rule of reason. 47 A market-division is illegal per se if it is found to
be inherently anticompetitive. 48 To establish a per se case, the
plaintiff need only prove that the anticompetitive behavior occurred, there being no other elements to the offense and no allowable defenses. 49 The per se rule thus finds anticompetitive behavior
illegal as a matter of law and terminates further analysis.5 °
A restraint of trade that is not characterized as a per se offense is
analyzed under the rule of reason.5 ' The rule of reason permits
45. See supra notes 4-5.
46. The rule had its genesis in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897), in which the Court found the defendants guilty of price fixing yet did not
remand the case for trial. In the most recent pronouncement regarding the per se rule,
the Supreme Court noted that "per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances
make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further
examination of the challenged conduct." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct 2948, 2962 (1984). Thus, the courts look to the
Supreme Court's directives as to which restraints are to be relegated to the per se
category.
47. See infra notes 51-52.
48. In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984) the Supreme Court noted that per se rules should not be
invoked until considerable judicial experience with the restraint has shown it to be inherently anticompetitive. See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct.
1551 (hospital's exclusive arrangement with anethstsiologist firm held not sufficiently anticompetitive to justify application of the per se rule). But see Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1982) (maximum fee arrangement for medical care held per se illegal).
49. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23 (1940). Justice
Thurgood Marshall has suggested this rationale behind the per se rule:
Per se rules contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the assumption that the gains from the rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant
administrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive
harm plus the administrative costs of determining in what particular situations
the practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result. If
the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they
are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
50. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), the Court noted
that a price-fixing and market-division agreement among manufacturers of vitreous pottery was so clearly anticompetitive that such "[a]greements which create such potential
power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without
the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable."
Id. at 397.
51. The rule of reason has its roots in the fact that if section 1 of the Sherman Act
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courts to decide whether the market-division is significantly and
unreasonably anticompetitive in purpose and effect before it is adjudged to be lawful or unlawful. 2 Under the rule of reason, the
defendants may come forward with justifications in order to explain their apparent deviation from the operations of a free market. 3 Thus, if a market-division agreement is to survive at all, it
must initially be54 characterized as a restraint to be judged under the
rule of reason.
Judicial analysis under the rule of reason is currently accorded
only to vertical market-division agreements.5 5 Horizontal marketdivision agreements are currently characterized as illegal per se. 56
The disparity in treatment was laid down in two Supreme Court
decisions: Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.57 and
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.5 s The Sylvania decision held
were to be read literally it would bar any commercial contract which touches upon trade
or business. "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Therefore, a literal interpretation of the statute could render illegal
any contract "in the whole field of human activity . . . if in restraint of trade.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
Consequently, the statute has been interpreted to prohibit only undue restraints of
trade. Id. An undue restraint of trade is one which may suppress or even destroy competition, as opposed to a restraint which regulates and thereby promotes competition. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
52. Justice Brandies spelled out the factors to be determined under a rule of reason
analysis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition. . . . To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
53. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 227-29.
54. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 104
S. Ct. 2948, 2957 (1984). Much of the confusion which surrounds the characterization of
market-division agreements stems from the initial analysis that the court must make at
the outset of the case. The court's initial decision characterizing the restraint is crucial to
the outcome of the case. Placing a restraint in the rule of reason category, however, is not
indicative of its per se lawfulness. The rule of reason accords the defendants an opportunity to justify their apparent deviation from the free market. See generally L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 30, at §§ 70-72.
. Continental T.V., inc. v. GiTE Syivania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Court
stated that applying per se illegality to vertical market-division agreements was to be
"abandoned in favor of a return to the rule of reason." Id. at 57.
56. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). The Court stated that "[t]he district court failed to
make any determination as to whether there were per se horizontal territorial restraints in
this case and simply applied the rule of reason in reaching its conclusions. . . . In so
doing, the district court erred." Id. at 608.
57. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
58. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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that challenged vertical market-division agreements are to be analyzed for their reasonableness under the rule of reason. 59 The
Topco decision, on the other hand, relegated horizontal marketdivision agreements to the illegal per se category.60
The Topco Decision:
Horizontal Market-Division and the Per Se Rule
The Topco case involved a horizontal market-division agreement
that designated territories in which small grocers could sell private-label products.61 Twenty-five small and medium-sized supermarket chains had formed an association, Topco Associates, which
62
promulgated the private-label program across thirty-three states.
Topco acted as a purchasing agent for its members, developed
specifications for private-label products, and performed other tasks
which gave members efficiencies attainable only by much larger
chains.63
Topco promulgated a rule which provided that members could
sell Topco-brand products only in designated territories.64 The restraint promulgated by Topco had a plausible connection with efficiency although it was implemented by competing firms.65
59. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57.
60. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
61. A "private-label" is a less expensive alternative to products distributed by such
national canners as Libby's and Green Giant. Topco, 405 U.S. at 599, n.3.
62. Topco Associates was founded in the 1940's by a group of small grocery chains.
The Association was a corporation in which all the members owned the common stock in
equal distributions. Id. at 598-99.
63. The Court's opinion recognized the efficiencies of the private label program: "It
is obvious that by using private-label products a chain can achieve significant cost economies in purchasing, transportation, warehousing, promotion, and advertising. These
economies may afford the chain opportunities for offering private-label products at lower
prices than other brand name products." Id. at 599, n.3.
64. Article IX, sec. 2, of Topco's bylaws established three categories of territorial
licenses that members could secure from the Association:
(a) Exclusive: An exclusive territory is one in which the member is licensed to
sell all products bearing specified trademarks of the Association, to the exclusion of all others.
(b) Non-exclusive: A non-exclusive territory is one in which the member is
licensed to sell all products bearing specified products of the Association, but
not to the exclusion of others who may also be licensed to sell products bearing
the same trademarks of the Association in the same territory.
(c) Coextensive: A coextensive territory is one in which two (2) or more
members are licensed to sell all products bearing specified trademarks of the
Association to the exclusion of all other[s]. . ..
Topco, 405 U.S. at 601-02.
65. See supra note 63.
After remand, the District Court entered a judgment enjoining the use of agreements
limiting the territories in which members could sell Topco products. The decree permit-
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Intrabrand competition among Topco members was diminished,
but interbrand competition with such national supermarket chains
as A & P, Safeway, and Kroger was enhanced.66 The proposed
justification for the practice was that the effective promotion of the
private-label products was feasible only if the chains asked to incur
the expense of the promotions also reaped the benefits.67 The
Supreme Court rejected Topco's free-rider elimination argument,
reasoning that the "restraint in this case is a horizontal one, and
' '6
therefore a per se violation of section 1.

8

In fashioning a per se proscription for horizontal market-division agreements, the Supreme Court noted that courts are illequipped to examine difficult economic problems. 69 The Court
reasoned that an agreement between competitors to allocate territories in order to minimize competition was a "classic example of a
per se violation of section 1."' O The Topco Court thus surmised
that most or all horizontal market-division agreements were anticompetitive and therefore should be per se illegal. 7' In its decision to characterize all horizontal market-division agreements as
per se illegal, however, the Court also placed potentially procompetitive agreements under the per se shroud.72
ted the defendant members to create areas of prime responsibility for individual members
in which they could take primary responsibility for promoting the Topco brand. The
decree also permitted designation of location clauses designating the place or places of
business for which a trademark license could be issued but not where this might result in
territorial exclusivity. The decree also permitted termination of membership for failure
to promote Topco products adequately and, further, permitted use of "passover" arrangements for compensation for goodwill developed by a single Topco member.
The government appealed, contending that allowing the permissive clauses of the decree to become effective was tantamount to permitting a continuation of the exclusive
territory arrangement struck down by the Court one year earlier. Despite the government's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree by an evenly divided vote.
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
66. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
67. Topco presents a perfect example of a horizontal market-division implemented to
eliminate free-riding in the interest of promoting a common trademark.
68. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id. at 608. The Court was relying heavily on the fact that the illegal per se proscription had been vigorously applied to horizontal price-fixing agreements. It was the
clear probability that Such practice was anticompetitive that made it a classic example of
a per se violation. Economists had recognized, however, that horizontal market-division
agreements could be implemented for procompetitive as well as anticompetitive purposes.
The Topco court believed that the salutary effect of the per se rule outweighed elevating
all market-division to the per se category. Id. at 609.
71. Id. at 609.
72. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608. Topco was criticized by economists and commentators,
most notably Professor Robert Bork, who noted that the Court had misperceived the task
which had been laid before it. See R. BORK, supra note 10, at 274-79. Topco had been
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The Sylvania Decision:
A Rule of Reason Analysis for Vertical
Market-Division
Five years after the Topco decision, the Supreme Court was required to characterize a vertical market-division agreement in Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.7 3 Sylvania, a major
television manufacturer with a declining share of the market, abandoned its policy of saturation distribution 4 and moved to a smaller
group of franchised retailers.75 Sylvania's new plan contemplated
an advertising and promotion blitz and allocated territories to franchisees in order to eliminate free-riding.76
The market-division in Sylvania was similar in character to the
agreement in Topco and was also intended to eliminate free-riding. 7 It was classified as a vertical restraint, however, because the
preceeded by an earlier, though quite similar case, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967). In Sealy, the Court had faced characterizing an agreement which contained
both price-fixing and market-division elements aimed at eliminating free-riding. The
Sealy Court found the aggregate of restraints to be illegal per se probably because the
price-fixing elements of the case poisoned the market-division. Sealy, 388 U.S. at 357.
In Sealy, however, the Court had given an example of a market-division agreement
which was in many respects similar to the agreement which was struck down in Topco.
Id. at 357. The faint pangs of reform in Sealy were erased, however, when the Court in
Topco noted that "to the extent that Sealy casts doubt on whether horizontal territorial
limitations, unaccompanied by price-fixing, are per se violations of the Sherman Act, we
remove that doubt today." Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.9 (1972).
73. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Sylvania decision overruled an earlier case, United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), in which the Court held a vertical market-division agreement implemented to eliminate free-riding among bicycle distributors
and retailers to be illegal per se. Id. at 378. The Schwinn decision was criticized by
economists and commentators who stressed that the Court ignored the procompetitive
effects which could be attributed to the elimination of free-riding. See Bork, Vertical
Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. (1977); Posner, The Rule of Reason
and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 1
(1977).
74. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38 (1977). "Saturation distribution" occurs when a manufacturer sells its product to independent or company-owned distributors who in turn resell the product to a large and diverse group of retailers.
75. Id.
76. Before 1962, Sylvania, a manufacturer of color television sets, sold to wholesalers
who resold to a large and diverse group of retailers. In an effort to avert a decline in its
market share to 1 or 2 percent, Sylvania adopted the franchise system in which it sold to
a smaller number of retailers. Although Sylvania retained discretion to add franchises to
any market, the intent and effect of the system clearly were to decrease rivalry among
sellers of Sylvania products. Whether because the system induced greater dealer effort or
for other reasons, Sylvania's share of the national market rose to 5 percent by 1965. Id.
at 38.
77. The franchise agreement that Sylvania implemented did not grant exclusive territories to franchisees. Sylvania reserved the fight to grant new franchises in areas near
other franchises depending upon sales volume and other factors. See supra note 64.
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manufacturer was party to the agreement. 78 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's per se ruling and reasoned that the court
erred by refusing to hear Sylvania's justification arguments.79 On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit and held
that vertical market-division agreements would be tested under the
rule of reason.8 °
In Sylvania, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining intrabrand
competition at a level consistent with the efficient distribution of
their products. 8 1 The Court further reasoned that the procompetitive benefits that could result from increased interbrand competition justified applying the rule of reason to vertical agreements.82
The Court held, however, that only vertical market-division agreements would be tested under the rule of reason despite the recognition that "[tihere may be occasional problems in differentiating
vertical restrictions from horizontal
restrictions originating in
83
retailers.
among
agreements
After Sylvania, challenged vertical market-division agreements
were elevated to a rule of reason analysis. 84 Horizontal marketdivision presented a different dilemma to the Court because such
78. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38. In contrast to the horizontal agreement in Topco, the
agreement in Sylvania was a vertical arrangement since two levels of the market, the
manufacturer and its resellers, were linked by the agreement to divide markets.
79. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental TV., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1004 (9th Cir.), afftd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
80. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59. The Sylvania decision was the last decision in a trilogy
of opinions in which the Supreme Court addressed the legality of vertical market-division. In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963), the Court reversed
and remanded for trial a case where the district court had accepted the Justice Department's contention that vertical market-division was illegal per se. The Court said that
"we know too little of the actual impact of vertical territorial restrictions" to decide the
legality or illegality on the bare record of a summary judgment for the government. Id.
at 261.
Four years later, the majority of the Supreme Court, distinguishing White Motor, held
that vertical market-division was per se illegal in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). The Court stated that "under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas . . . in which
an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it." Id. at
379.
Changing direction again in Syivania, the Supreme Court rejected the per se illegality
rule of Schwinn, stating that "we conclude that the appropriate decision is to return to
the rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn." Sylvania, 433
U.S. at 59.
81. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56.
82. Id. at 54.
83. Id. at 58, n.28; see also supra note 41.
84. The Court left the door slightly ajar for applying per se illegality to particular
applications of vertical market-divisions. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58.
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agreements can be implemented for anticompetitive as well as
procompetitive purposes.8 5 Under the Topco rationale, 86 all horizontal market-division agreements are placed in the per se
category.
The horizontal/vertical dichotomy created by Topco and Sylvania has posed problems for courts faced with the task of assessing
the legality of procompetitive market-division agreements implemented in horizontal structures. 7 In fact, judicial reluctance in
attaching a per se proscription to procompetitive horizontal agreements is evidenced by a trend among courts to place horizontal
agreements in the vertical category in order to avoid the Topco
rule. 8 A more useful guide for modern courts faced with assessing
the legality of procompetitive horizontal market-division agreements is provided by the ancillary restraints doctrine.8 9
DISCUSSION

Ancillary Restraints and Market-Division Agreements
The ancillary restraints doctrine elevates a restraint with
procompetitive attributes to a rule of reason analysis notwithstanding the structure in which the restraint is implemented. 90 The doctrine can be applied to price-fixing, 91 and tying arrangements 92 as
85. Although there are no statistics available, horizontal market-division agreements
can pose a threat to competition because they present either a combination or a conspiracy between competing firms or firms in the same line of business. The potential for
abuse is apparent. That all horizontal market-division agreements have a pernicious effect on competition, however, has been shown to be a fallacy. See R. BORK, supra note
10, at 430-31.
86. Professor Sullivan has noted that many courts have tested horizontal marketdivision agreements under the rule of reason where the court was presented with something less than a "flat out" naked agreement. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at § 81.
87. See e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir.
1978) (national mattress licensors' agreement presented ambiguity to court over whether
restraint was horizontal or vertical); Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954, 959
(5th Cir. 1978) (market-division implemented by Conoco had both horizontal and vertical attributes); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 486 F. Supp. 1047, 1060 (S.D.
Ohio 1980) (restructuring of corporate entity rendered vertical rather than horizontal
market-division); West Texas Util. Co. v. Texas Elec. Serv., 470 F. Supp. 798, 830-31
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (market-division among public utility presented ambiguity between
horizontal and vertical market-division).
88. See supra notes 86-87.
89. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
91. Joint ventures sometimes include agreements under which two competitors specifically agree to fix prices. For example, an agreement between two competitors in a
joint venture to submit a joint bid to build a subway system will necessarily contain pricefixing elements. Although competition between the two contractors is eradicated, interbrand competition with other contractors submitting subway bids is enhanced. The
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well as market-division agreements. 93 The doctrine was introduced
nearly ninety years ago in the Sixth Circuit opinion of United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 94
Addyston Pipe involved a section 1 action against six manufacturers who had agreed to fix prices and allocate selling territories
for cast-iron pipe. 95 In deciding how the agreement would be characterized, the court of appeals accorded restraints which were ancillary, those that were subordinate and collateral to another
legitimate purpose, to a rule of reason analysis. 96 The court then
held that naked restraints, those that did nothing more than eliminate competition, would be placed in the illegal per se category. 97
The difference between an ancillary and a naked market-division
is best illustrated by returning to the Steinway piano retailers example. 98 An agreement among the Steinway retailers allocating
selling territories in order to facilitate a promotional effort constiagreement between the collusive contractors is "ancillary" to the lawful purpose of securing the construction contract. One court has held that where a subsidiary price-fixing
agreement is necessary to accomplish the socially desirable purpose of the joint venture,
the agreement will receive a rule of reason analysis. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
92. Tying agreements generally take the form of a seller requiring a buyer to purchase
a product from the seller that the buyer does not desire in order to be allowed to purchase
a desired product the seller offers. For example, if a tying product might malfunction
unless it is used with a complementary product of high quality, a seller may require use of
its own high quality complementary product to ensure optimal performance. If such an
arrangement is indeed lawful to a legitimate business purpose, it should receive a rule of
reason analysis. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947);
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afl'd per curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
93. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
94. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and afid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Addyston Pipe
was decided by Circuit Judge, later President and Chief Justice, William Howard Taft.
Taft believed that since every contract was a restraint of trade, the rationale for judging
them lawful or unlawful should be the restraint's contribution to efficiency and ultimately, to its effect on competition. See R. BORK, supra note 10, at 26-30.
95. Id. at 280-82.
96. The court recognized that some restrictions on rivalry were socially valuable and
to provide the necessary guidelines for judging these it offered the concept of the ancillary
restraint. 85 F. 271 at 280. To be ancillary, and hence judged under the rule of reason.
an agreement diminishing or eliminating competition had to be subordinate and collateral
to a separate, legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral
in the sense that it makes the main transaction more effective in accomplishing procompetitive purposes. See R. BORK, supra note 10, at 27-29.
97. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. 271 at 291. In contrast to ancillary restraints, a naked restraint is implemented in order to eliminate competition and reap monopoly profits. A
naked market-division serves no efficiency function other than the elimination of competition. 85 F. 271 at 280.
98. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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tutes a horizontal market-division aimed at the elimination of freeriding. 99 The agreement is also ancillary to the joint promotional
effort because the promotion is a lawful activity intended to
achieve maximum interbrand competition." ° Addyston Pipe's ancillary restraints doctrine would test the legality of the agreement
under a rule of reason analysis. 0 1 Under the Topco rule, however,
the market-division would be illegal per se.' °2 Alternatively, the
Steinway retailers may agree to allocate territories solely to reap
monopoly profits. 0 3 Under Addyston Pipe, such an agreement is a
non-ancillary, naked restraint and therefore would be relegated to
the per se category. 104
The ancillary restraints doctrine was frequently applied by
courts immediately following its formulation in Addyston Pipe.105
Application of the doctrine declined as horizontal and vertical
structure gradually became the tool courts employed to characterize market-division agreements. 106 In General Leaseways, Inc. v.
National Truck Leasing Association," 7 however, the Seventh Cir99. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
100. Addyston Pipe suggested that it was fairly simple to determine whether the restraint was ancillary or naked because the purpose of the main transaction "suggests the
measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficient standard by which the validity of
the restraint may be judicially determined." 85 F. 271 at 282.
101. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 21.
104. The ancillary restraints doctrine, unlike the per se rule, places risk in having a
naked restraint judged under the rule of reason. Although the likelihood of a naked
market-division surviving a rule of reason analysis is low, this may be better than to
proscribe potentially procompetitive market-division agreements under the per se rule.
The per se rule, however, is preserved for naked horizontal agreements. See Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 ANTITRUST L.J. 211, 217 (1959).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co., 105 F. 93, 103 (6th Cir.
1900) (agreement to divide markets and restrict the output of coal found to be a naked
restraint of trade); Lowry v. Tile & Mantel Ass'n of Calif., 98 F. 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1899)
(agreement to raise the price of fireplace fixtures found to be a non-ancillary, naked restraint); Cravens v. Carter-Crume Co., 92 F. 479, 485-86 (6th Cir. 1899) (agreement to
limit the production of wooden dishes throughout the United States found to be an nonancillary restraint of trade).
106. Professor Bork has referred to the Addyston Pipe decision as the "high watermark of rational antitrust doctrine." See R. BORK, supra note 10, at 29-30. The doctrine
has had a faint rebirth in the last few years. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395-98 (9th Cir. 1984) (NFL's
rule requiring three-fourths of member teams to approve a team's moving into another
team's league held to be non-ancillary restraint of trade); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo
Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265-66 (7th Cir. 1981) (noncompetition covenants that were ancillary
to legitimate acquisition by plaintiff held to be reasonable restraints of trade).
107. 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
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cuit revived the ancillary restraints doctrine in order to characterize a horizontal market-division agreement.
General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Association
Factual Background
The plaintiff, General Leaseways, was engaged in leasing trucks
to businesses on a full-service basis.'° Full-service leases provided
that General Leaseways was responsible for maintaining and repairing the trucks if they broke down.° 9 Many of the leases provided for "over-the-road" service, which meant that the lessee
could drive the truck anywhere in the United States. 10
General Leaseways was a member of the National Truck Leasing Association which administered among its approximately 130
members a reciprocal service arrangement which enabled each
member to lease trucks on a full-service, over-the-road basis."'
The Association's rules required each member to repair other
members' leased trucks." 2 The price that members charged each
other for the repair service was not fixed, but it was substantially
lower than the price charged non-members." 3
The Association disseminated trade information to members,
and also administered a joint fuel purchasing program.' ' Members shared a trademark, "NationaLease," but neither the Association nor its members advertised or promoted the trademark
extensively." 5 Each member operated under an Association
franchise agreement that designated the particular location at
which a member could do business as a National franchisee. ' 6
Franchises were spaced at least 10 to 20 miles apart so that they
could not compete for the same customers." 7 In addition, the Association forbade its members to affiliate with any other full-service
truck leasing firm."'
General Leaseway defied the location and non-affiliation restrictions and was expelled from the Association for its infractions. 119
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 589.
Id.
Id.

111.

1U,

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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It brought suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act and alleged that
the market-division agreement promulgated by the Association
was an unlawful restraint of trade. 20 The district court entered an
injunction ordering the Association not to expel General
Leaseways. 12 ' The Association appealed and the Seventh Circuit

was required to consider, among other things, the "bounds of permissible cooperation
among competitors under section 1 of the
22
Sherman Act." 1

The Seventh Circuit Opinion
The court of appeals upheld the decision of the district court and
found that the Association had most likely promulgated a naked
horizontal market-division agreement intended solely to decrease
competition among Association members. 123 The Seventh Circuit
noted that the geographical division of markets among the Association's members did not appear to be ancillary to the reciprocal
provision of repair service or any other lawful activity.' 24 The
court of appeals thus concluded that the market-division was more
likely than not a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 125
The Seventh Circuit initially noted that, until Sylvania, where
firms in the same line of business agreed not to enter each other's
territories they violated section 1 even if they could show that their
market-division agreement yielded benefits greater than the cost of
diminished competition. 126 The court reasoned that the Sylvania
decision, although itself a case which addressed the legality of vertical market-division, cast doubt over the continued blanket application of the per se rule established for horizontal market-division
27
agreements in Topco.1

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Seventh Circuit was required to consider the likelihood that the plaintiff
would prevail on the merits in its decision to affirm or reverse the grant of the preliminary
injunction. Although the record before the court was necessarily limited, the facts were
such that the court could confidently apply the ancillary restraints doctrine. See id. at
595.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. The Association argued that the
lawful and legitimate purpose of providing reciprocal repair services at less than exorbitant prices justified its territory and non-affiliation restrictions. In effect, that such restraint were "ancillary" to a lawful main purpose. Id. at 592-93.
125. General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 595.
126. Id. at 591.
127. The Seventh Circuit did not address or resolve that tension, however, because
the Association failed to make a plausible free-rider argument. Id. at 593.
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The Seventh Circuit next rejected the proposition that the Association's territorial restriction was a reasonable measure intended
to eliminate a free-rider effect by which multi-franchised members
like General Leaseways could exploit the underpricing of reciprocal repair service. 2 ' The court reasoned that lawful market-division agreements were tolerated to enable firms to safely
disseminate information such as advertising and promotions.'29
The court noted that whereas virtually nobody will pay to consume
advertising or promotions, Association members charged each
other for reciprocal repairs. 3 ° Moreover, the court noted that as a
member of the Association added franchises, it put itself in a position to expect more service calls as well as to demand more service
13
from others. 1

The Seventh Circuit next examined the market-division agreement under the rationale laid down in Addyston Pipe.132 The court
noted that although some degree of cooperation among Association members was necessary for providing reciprocal services, the
connection between the restraint and the Association's cooperation
needs which would raise the restraint from merely naked to an ancillary one was missing because no plausible reason had been suggested why Association members were forbidden to compete with
each other. '3 The court thus determined that the Association's
market-division agreement was not ancillary to the reciprocal repair arrangement nor any other lawful business purpose and was
most likely a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 134
Finally, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the preliminary
injunction could be upheld if the case were decided under the rule
of reason, noting that its initial per se condemnation could be incorrect. 13 In its examination of purpose and effect, 1 36 the court
noted that evidence had been presented which demonstrated that
where there were few truck leasing firms, prices for leases were
128. Id. at 592. The court noted that this argument was "terribly speculative." Id.
The court also noted that as a member of the Association grew, "it put itself in a position
to expect more service calls on itself, as well as to demand more service from others." Id.
129. Id. at 592-93.
130. Id.
131.

IU.

at

1792.

132. Id. at 595.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 596; see also supra note 52. The Seventh Circuit was following the example of the Tenth Circuit in Athletic National Collegiate Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 707 F.2d 1147, 1157 (10th Cir. 1983), affd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
136. In economic terms, this indicated that the Association and its members had the
market power to affect prices. General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 596.
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higher.137 The court reasoned that this evidence suggested a weakness of competition which tended to show that the Association had
enough market power to restrain competition. 38 Accordingly, the
court found that under the rule of reason, the market-division
agreement was more likely than not an unlawful restraint of
trade.'

39

ANALYSIS

The current approach utilized by most courts to assess the legality of market-division agreements begins with an initial identification of the structure by which the agreement has been
implemented.' 40 Once the structure has been identified, 4 ' vertical
agreements are elevated to the rule of reason under Sylvania while
horizontal agreements are placed in the per se category under
Topco. 142 A horizontal market-division agreement with procompetitive attributes, however, creates a tension between Sylvania and
Topco. Courts have traditionally resolved the tension in two ways:
by applying Topco's per se proscription'4 3 or by classifying the
market-division as a vertical restraint.'"
This method of resolving the issue has proven inadequate, especially when a procompetitive horizontal agreement is automatically placed in the per se category under the rigid Topco rule.' 45
Further, a reclassification of structure has caused many courts to
strain in order to elevate a procompetitive horizontal market-divi46
sion agreement to a rule of reason analysis. 1
The Seventh Circuit recognized in General Leaseways that
137. General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 596.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra note 42.
141. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
143. In West Texas Util. Co. v. Texas Elec. Serv., 470 F. Supp. 798, 831 (N.D. Texas
1979), the district court applied the per se rule to a boycott and market-division arrangement although the court noted that as to the procompetitive effects of the arrangement it
was "difficult . . . to determine which pigeonhole the facts in this case belong." Id. at
831.
144. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
145. After Sylvania, courts determine the legality of vertical restraints under the rule
of reason while horizontal restraints are held to be per se illegal. 433 U.S. 36 at 59. Thus,
the ancillary restraints doctrine is of particular utility in elevating a procompetitive horizontal market-division agreement out of the per se category and into a rule of reason
analysis. In fact, the doctrine is of particular utility for all restraints now relegated to the
per se category. See supra note 4; see also R. BORK, supra note 10, at 30.
146. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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neither device is adequate.' 4 7 As a result, the court employed Addyston Pipe's ancillary restraint doctrine which elevates potentially
procompetitive arrangements to the rule of reason category. 14 8
Although the Seventh Circuit properly endorsed the utilization of
the ancillary restraints doctrine, the court correctly applied the per
se rule to the horizontal market-division agreement because the
agreement was not ancillary, but rather was naked in that it restricted competition and indirectly raised prices.' 4 9
Application of the ancillary restraints doctrine supersedes the
Topco rule presently used by most courts to assess the legality of
horizontal market-division agreements. 5 0 Although a horizontal
market-division is more likely to be the focal point of an anticompetitive restraint' 5 ' than a vertical market-division, the ancillary
restraints doctrine requires more than a simple identification of
structure before per se condemnation is rendered.152 Application
of the ancillary restraints doctrine may thus save a procompetitive
horizontal market-division agreement which might otherwise be
placed in the per se category under the rigid Topco test.
Further, the ancillary restraints doctrine eliminates the need to
reclassify a procompetitive horizontal market-division as a vertical
one in order to avoid the Topco rule. 153 The doctrine correctly
supposes that a horizontal market-division agreement should ultimately stand or fall on the basis of its procompetitive or anticompetitive attributes. 15 The doctrine's fundamental criterion for
lifting a horizontal market-division out of the category of per se
illegality is neither its explicitness or implicitness, nor its horizontal or vertical nature, but its capacity for contributing to
efficiency. 15
147.

General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 594.

148. The doctrine's fundamental criterion for lifting a horizontal market division out
of the per se category is neither its explicitness nor its implicitness, nor its horizontal or
vertical nature, but its capacity for contributing to efficiency. See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at
283.

149.

The ancillary restraints doctrine does not alter the substantive aspects of the rule

of reason or the per se rule. See supra notes 96-97.

150. The doctrine "supersedes" the Topco rule in the sense that it does not cut short
analysis after an agreement is shown to be ancillary to a lawful purpose. See R. BORK,
.',nranote !0, at 267.

151. See supra note 41.
152. See supra note 148.
153. See supra note 87.
154. The increased consumer welfare which may result from a procompetitive market-division agreement may justify determining its legality under the rule of reason. The
efficiency and welfare which may result will justify the court's time and effort. See R.
BORK, supra note 10, at 29-30.
155. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979),

19851

Ancillary Restraints Doctrine

It is still necessary under the ancillary restraints doctrine for
courts to distinguish between vertical and horizontal structure in
order to apply the per se rule to a naked horizontal market-division
agreement. The Topco court recognized that the per se rule provides predictability for business people and their counsel., 56 Application of the per se rule has eliminated many anticompetitive
market-division agreements and no doubt thousands of others have
never been launched because of the overhanging threat of the
rule. 57
The Seventh Circuit recognized in General Leaseways that testing the lawfulness of all horizontal market-division agreement
under the rule of reason would eradicate the predictability of the
per se rule and would take up considerable judicial time and effort.' 5 8 The ancillary restraints doctrine preserves the integrity of
the per se rule for naked market-division agreements. 59 Judicial
time and effort is well-spent analyzing potentially procompetitive,
ancillary agreements under the rule of reason. 6 °
As the increasing complexity of marketing arrangements brings
challenges under the Sherman Act, such arrangements should
stand or fall on the basis of their anticompetitive or procompetitive
effect. The Seventh Circuit's application of the ancillary restraints
doctrine in General Leaseways signals a change in the tenor of section 1jurisprudence and a recognition of the ability of a horizontal
market-division to contribute to productive efficiency.' 6 ' A rebirth
the Supreme Court held that a blanket license issued in order to give song purchasers
access to a repertoire of thousands of songs enhanced efficiency enough to pull the agreement out of the per se category. Id. at 18. Addyston Pipe's rationale would have found
the agreement ancillary to the lawful purpose of providing songs en masse and would
have analyzed the agreement under the rule of reason.
156. The salutary effects of a per se rule for anticompetitive market-division were
discussed at great length in the Topco opinion. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609. See generally
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept (Part I), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965);
Comment, Horizontal TerritorialRestraints and the Per Se Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 457 (1971).
157. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept (Part II), 75 YALE L.J.
373, 384-87 (1966). Bork argues that the salutary effects of the per se rule justify its use
in antitrust law. He further argues that the ancillary restraints doctrine provides courts
with the best device for applying a rule of reason analysis to potentially procompetitive
agreements while retaining the vitality of the per se rule for naked restraints.
158. The Seventh Circuit noted that "the per se rule would collapse if every claim of
economies from restricting competition, however implausible, could be used to move a
horizontal agreement not to compete from the per se to the rule of reason category."
General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 595.
159. See supra note 97.
160. See supra note 96.
161. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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of the ancillary restraints doctrine may soon cast doubt over the
continued application of the Topco rule. The fate of the Topco decision will ultimately be determined if and when the Supreme
Court sanctions and adopts the ancillary restraints doctrine.
CONCLUSION

The utility of the market-division agreement as a tool that firms
can use to increase business efficiency should not be undermined by
a misapplication of the antitrust laws. Since economic analysis has
shown that firms in the same line of business may implement market-division agreements for procompetitive purposes, the legality of
such agreements, if shown to be ancillary to a lawful purpose,
should be tested under the rule of reason. The per se rule is preserved for naked horizontal market-division agreements.
The ancillary restraints doctrine presents a standard which elevates potentially procompetitive agreements to a rule of reason
analysis. In General Leaseways, the Seventh Circuit took a step in
the right direction by applying the ancillary restraints doctrine.
Antitrust jurisprudence will become more rational as it allows economic efficiency to guide its judgment of challenged market-division agreements. The outcome of General Leaseways illustrates
that the Seventh Circuit is moving in the right direction.
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